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Abstract 
While state environmental and natural resource spending is designed to address actual 
environmental problems, the budget process is also inherently political. Thus, in the following 
article we ask a simple question: to what extent does state environmental and natural resource 
spending respond to the scope of environmental problems in a state, versus the demands of the 
political process? Unlike the bulk of previous research, we consider both aggregate spending 
and program-specific spending. We also consider how the severity of environmental problems 
and the political environment may interact to determine spending. The findings show that 
politics, specifically the strength of the environmental movement, is a more important 
determinant of state environmental spending than pollution severity. However, for some 
program areas, it appears that strong environmental groups make state budgets more 
responsive to the severity of environmental problems. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Intuitively, the scope and intensity of state environmental policies should be roughly 
proportional to the severity of environmental problems. However, because 
environmental policies are only partly determined by bureaucrats with technical 
expertise, the desires of political interests may be more important than actual 
environmental problems in determining state environmental spending. In the following 
article, we explore how the severity of environmental problems, the preferences of 
relevant political actors, and the interaction of the two shape state budget allocations 
toward spending on the environment and natural resources. 
 
Scholars have examined the relationships among environmental problems, political 
actors, and state environmental spending at length (Bacot & Dawes, 1996, 1997). 
However, unlike previous work, we examine aggregate spending and spending in 
several environmental policy areas using multiple indicators of environmental problem 
severity. This allows us to examine how specific environmental problems affect 
spending in related areas. We also consider how political factors and the extent of 
environmental degradation interact to influence resource allocation toward 
environmental policy. The analysis adds to our understanding of how spending on 
environmental policies is shaped by politics and environmental problems. It also allows 
us to determine whether spending on certain environmental issue areas (e.g. water, 
pesticides) are more or less responsive to political or problem-related pressures. 
Although results vary across different models we find that environment and natural 
resource spending is consistently influenced by the strength of a state's environmental 
movement and that the severity of environmental problems are not generally a major 
determinant of spending. In some situations, environmental interests are able to 
influence environmental spending when there are greater environmental problems, 
indicating that saliency may help overcome collective action problems that may 
otherwise disadvantage these groups (Olson, 1965). 
  
   
Environmental Politics, Problems and State Spending 
A number of scholars have examined the determinants of environmental policy in the 
states, with studies focused on areas such as mining oversight (Hedge & Scicchitano, 
1994), air pollution (Potoski & Woods, 2002), pollution control (Lowry, 1992), air and 
water quality regulations (Ringquist, 1993), groundwater policy adoption (Blomquist, 
1991), and hazardous waste spending (Williams & Matheny, 1984). Others have 
examined broader indicators of state environmental "effort" (Bacot & Dawes, 1996, 
1997; Hays, Esler, & Hays, 1996). To assess overall "effort," scholars have used either 
expenditures (Bacot & Dawes, 1996, 1997) or indexes of environmental regulations and 
enforcement (Hall & Kerr, 1991; Ridley, 1987). 
 
Collectively, these studies show inconsistent influences of political actors such as 
organized interests and public opinion. For example, Bacot and Dawes (1996) find that 
interest group strength influences state environmental "effort." However, Ringquist 
(1993) finds that interest groups influence state water pollution programs, but not air 
pollution control programs. Public opinion is also an inconsistent influence on policy, 
with some studies finding a relationship (Hays, Esler, & Hays, 1996; Hedge & 
Scicchitano, 1994) and others failing to observe one (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Ringquist, 
1993). 
 
While the influence of environmental actors varies in these studies depending on the 
particular issue/policy in question, one might expect a more consistent relationship 
between environmental problems and the scope of environmental policies, or what 
some scholars have called "effort" (Bacot & Dawes, 1996, 1997). However, on balance, 
the literature shows that state policies do not always respond to the severity of 
environmental problems. Bacot and Dawes (1996, 1997) find that pollution severity 
(measured as toxic releases by industry) influences state environmental effort in the 
expected direction. However, Hays, Esler, and Hays (1996) find no such relationship 
looking at a composite measure of state effort (the Green Index). 
 
Thus, while some studies do find a relationship between politics, environmental 
problems, and state environmental policies, the relationships are quite inconsistent. In a 
nuanced and sophisticated look at state air pollution control policy, Potoski and Woods 
(2002) point out that environmental policy is multidimensional, and the importance of 
political factors varies across these dimensions. They argue that programs, such as 
setting standards, which require the allocation of resources and thus distributes costs 
and benefits, will attract the attention of political actors more than other dimensions, 
such as monitoring, which will be primarily a function of nonpolitical factors (like 
pollution severity). 
 
   
Political Factors Influencing Environmental Spending 
As budgeting clearly involves the allocation of resources and as the budget process is 
highly political, politics should be expected to influence environmental spending 
decisions. Bacot and Dawes (1996, 1997) found support for this in an analysis of 
aggregate spending on the environment. Using one indicator of pollution severity, they 
also found that states with greater pollution problems spend more on the environment 
and natural resources. However, analyzing aggregate spending masks a great deal of 
variation in the politics of the environmental budget-allocation process and the different 
types of pollution problems that different states face. Some environmental spending 
areas may be more or less responsive to political factors, while more salient 
environmental problems may be important on other types of spending. We reexamine 
the relationship between politics, problems, and environmental spending using a rich 
data source that includes spending in many program areas and measures of pollution 
severity relevant to these different programs. 
 
The generally anticipated relationship between environmental problems and spending is 
quite straightforward. States with more severe environmental problems should spend 
more money addressing those problems. This, of course, assumes that sensitivities to 
pollution and willingness to institute programs to restrict pollution are constant across 
states. This contention is certainly debatable. In fact, the willingness to enact policies 
and devote resources to curb pollution seems clearly related to, if not largely 
determined by, the state's political context. 
 
In the area of environmental policy, most scholars argue that liberal states enact liberal 
policies. For example, Hedge and Scicchitano (1994) find that liberal states have 
greener policies, and Hays, Esler, and Hays (1996) find that liberalism has an indirect 
effect on policy. Many studies, however, fail to observe any relationship between public 
opinion liberalism and state environmental policy. Ringquist (1993) finds that policy 
liberalism does not have a statistically significant influence on policy and notes that this 
may reflect that environmental issues do not fall neatly into the liberal–conservative 
continuum. This could also be attributed to the multidimensionality of the issue area 
(Potoski & Woods, 2002). We add that most of the public, regardless of ideology, is in 
favor of stricter environmental regulation (Dunlap & Scarce, 1991), even if, as Bosso 
and Guber (2006) note, there has been a decline in concern about the environment 
involving a lack of information, low salience, and ambivalence toward the issue. Still, 
conservative states as well as liberal ones may value their outdoors areas for 
agriculture, hunting, or fishing. Examining aggregate state spending, Bacot and Dawes 
(1997) also fail to observe a significant relationship between liberalism and spending. 
Bacot and Dawes (1996) also do not find a linkage between ideology and "effort". 
Although public opinion may influence spending, its influence is by no means taken as a 
given and warrants additional attention. 
 
Furthermore, environmental policies are often highly technical, meaning that the public's 
knowledge and interest of specific environmental programs is probably eclipsed. On 
such issues, it is reasonable to assume that interest groups that are better organized 
(Olson, 1965) or those with specific technical expertise would influence policy 
(Ringquist, 1993; Rosenbaum, 2004). Again, however, the findings related to interest 
group influence on environmental policy vary substantially. For example, examining 
several specific policy areas, Ringquist finds that environmental and industry groups 
influence state water pollution programs, but not air pollution control programs. Hedge 
and Scicchitano (1994) find that the strength of the coal industry in a state influences 
federal oversight of the mining industry. Bacot and Dawes (1997) find that 
environmental interest groups are a significant influence on expenditures, but not on the 
index of regulatory effort; notably, industry groups influence neither policy measure. 
 
We expect that environmental interest groups should be a more important determinant 
of state spending than business interests. This stems from the different incentives 
facing each group. Environmental spending is largely, if not entirely, a collective good. 
Since environmental interests are organized to pursue collective goods, they will 
certainly have an interest in state environmental spending levels. Examples of this 
concern with budgets are common. A fairly recent example is a report entitled "All Dried 
Up: How Clean Water is Threatened by Budget Cuts," which was released by the group 
American Rivers in September 2004.2 Moreover, environmental interests should have a 
greater influence on salient issues because of heightened public awareness to 
environmental issues or problems. 
 
Business will generally be less concerned with environmental spending because the 
political mobilization of business interests usually takes place at the firm level and is 
primarily intended to pursue private goods that will benefit a particular firm (Godwin & 
Seldon, 2002). Individual firms are less concerned with overall levels of effort and are 
more concerned with their individual firm's treatment. For example, a pesticide company 
is perfectly happy with rigorously enforced pollution regulations if they can receive an 
exemption from them or if the regulation only applies to other industries. Thus, it is not 
entirely surprising that Bacot and Dawes (1997) failed to observe a relationship between 
industry strength and environmental spending and effort. Vogel (1987) and Kamieniecki 
(2006) argue against the conclusions of Schattschneider (1960), Lindblom (1977), and 
others (Schlozman, 1984) who claimed systematic advantages in the policy process by 
businesses. Kamieniecki finds a lack of evidence of influence over regulatory 
rulemaking, and any business influence is dependent on the nature of the conflict over 
environmental issues. To the extent that industry does mobilize around broad policies, 
its influence should be most limited on salient issues given the advantages of 
environmental interests. As Smith (2000) notes, business often requires the backing of 
the public to get its way. Still, we do examine business interests in our analysis to 
assess their influence relative to environmental interests and for comparability with 
earlier studies. 
 
It is also possible that the state's political environment and the extent of pollution act 
together to influence state spending on environmental programs. Specifically, states 
with a strong environmental interest presence and severe pollution problems should 
demonstrate greater environmental expenditures. Environmental groups have the 
expertise and resources to pressure state decision makers to spend more on the 
environment. Thus, state decision makers may be more responsive to demands of 
environmental interests when these organizations can highlight legitimately severe 
pollution problems. This may help overcome the obstacles associated with the low 
salience of environmental issues and may help overcome collective action problems 
(Olson, 1965) or resource disadvantages (Schattschneider, 1960) of environmental 
interests. 
   
Other Factors Influencing Environmental Spending 
Several nonpolitical factors should also influence state spending on the environment. Potoski 
and Woods (2002) discuss the importance of capacity (to address environmental problems) and 
matching (solutions with scope of the problem). Certain states will have more resources with 
which to address environmental problems (Bacot & Dawes, 1996, 1997). Although Bacot and 
Dawes (1996) find no such relationship, we believe (as they did) that excess resources may be 
a precondition for higher levels of spending. Accordingly, a state's fiscal health should be an 
important indicator of its ability to pay for certain policies. 
 
Population is another factor that must be examined in any analysis of environmental spending 
(Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Potoski & Woods, 2002). Aside from polluting industries, most pollution 
results from everyday human activities such as driving automobiles. States with larger 
populations will therefore produce more aggregate pollution and spend more to achieve the 
same level of environmental protection of an otherwise similar state.3 We also consider state 
size because of the potential relationship between spending on the environment and total land 
and water area (Potoski & Woods, 2002). Larger states with more wild lands should 
demonstrate greater expenditures on certain types of programs, such as the protection of 
natural resources and wildlife. Despite the fact that New York has 30 times the population of 
Alaska, the Empire state spends less than the geographically larger of the two states on these 
programs. 
 
Finally, it is plausible that factors external to a given state influence spending patterns. States 
within the same geographic region may have similarities in spending patterns on environmental 
issues. For example, air pollution may flow from one state to another, resulting in one or more 
states having to increase environmental expenditures.4 
 
   
   
Design and Analysis    
We examine how the political factors discussed above (public opinion and environmental and 
business interests) and environmental problems influence spending on several state 
environmental programs while controlling for various other factors that may influence spending. 
We begin with an analysis of aggregate expenditures then examine the performance of the 
model across several different program areas. Given the nature of the dependent variable, 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is the appropriate estimation procedure, and it has 
been used for all statistical analyses. As some of the models demonstrated heteroskedasticity, 
models are estimated using robust standard errors.   
   
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are spending data consisting of aggregate environmental 
expenditures and expenditures in five specific program areas. We examine spending 
rather than regulation because the latter is more difficult to compare across program 
areas given the variation in the agencies involved and enforcement; spending is more 
comparable across states and programs. Like previous studies (Bacot & Dawes, 1996, 
1997), we examine total spending rather than per capita spending because total 
spending is a clearer indicator of overall state effort than per capita spending. Clearly, 
pollution is caused by human activity, but unlike many other state programs like 
education, healthcare, and welfare spending, it is not targeted at individuals.5 As we 
deal with spending as a collective good, it makes sense to focus on overall spending 
levels. However, per capita spending models were estimated and are found in the 
Appendix. The spending data were provided by the Environmental Council of the 
States, which is a nonpartisan and nonprofit association of state-level environmental 
commissioners; data refer to the FY2000 state budgets (descriptive statistics for these 
variables are available in Table 1). Ideally, we might examine multiple years of spending 
data; however, missing data in the disaggregated spending categories and the lack of 
data for key independent variables makes this problematic.6 Furthermore, the 
incremental nature of state budgets makes cross-sectional analysis useful (cf. 
Blomquist, 1999; Hofferbert, 1990). For example, spending in 2000 correlates at 0.80 
with spending in 1991 and year-to-year correlations are substantially higher. Although 
spending amounts change over time, most of the variation is cross-sectional rather than 
temporal. Aggregate environmental spending ranges from $39,780,217 (South Dakota) 
to $1,891,018,252 (California), with a mean of $271,161,171 and a standard deviation 
of 334,651,970. These data include all federal, state, and local money passing through 
the state budget (See Table 1).7 
 
Table 1. Aggregate Spending and Spending by Program Area  
 
Spending Variable Mean SD  Minimum Maximum 
 
Aggregate spending (millions) 271.16 334.65 39.78 1,891.02 
Air quality 17,607,620 23,781,040 992,050 124,497,000 
Water quality 46,609,298 77,275,998 78,611 382,976,000 
Forestry 25,976,827 54,869,290 727,180 370,318,000 
Fish and wildlife 44,742,022 40,184,364 965,193 221,265,000 
Pesticide 4,787,982 11,735,166 281,000 62,872,067 
 
Data provided by the Environmental Council of the States and are FY2000. 
 
 
 
 
To more carefully consider the relationships in question, we also examine 
disaggregated program areas including air quality, water quality, pesticides, forestry, 
and fish and wildlife (see Table 1). As with any state-level study of policy and spending, 
we had to contend with several problems in comparing one state to the next. Where 
actual expenditures were not available, we use state budgetary estimates. Expenditures 
for air quality concern any funds used to support the Clean Air Act or any state law 
addressing clean air. Water quality expenditures include meeting standards of the Clean 
Water Act and any money for water pollution abatement and protecting and maintaining 
water quality. Pesticide expenditures include funds to regulate agricultural and 
commercial use and sale of pesticides. Forestry expenditures include those funds 
appropriated for the protection and management of forest resources. Fish and wildlife 
include funds to enforce fish and game laws in the state, as well as the protection, 
enhancement, and management of fish and wildlife.8   
   
Independent Variables 
We expect states with substantial pollution problems to spend more on the environment 
than states without such problems. Choosing a measure of the severity of the 
environmental problems in a particular state presents some challenges, however. In 
their analysis of the determinants of state environmental spending, Bacot and Dawes 
(1997) use the per capita pounds of pollution released from the industrial/manufacturing 
sector. These authors recognize that a shortcoming of this measure is that it is biased 
toward a specific type of pollution—that caused by industrial and manufacturing firms. 
Thus, we have developed a more comprehensive pollution severity variable that 
measures several different types of pollution for use in the analysis of aggregate 
spending. 
 
We created a pollution severity index by combining state rankings of pollution severity in 
the areas of air pollution, water pollution, superfund sites, animal waste, and the amount 
of pollution released by the manufacturing/industrial sector. The data used to construct 
the pollution severity index were collected from the Environmental Defense, 
http://www.scorecard.org web page, which presents summaries of data released by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The data were published in 2002 but are 
derived from rankings up to three years prior to 2000. States are ranked by decile or 
quintile in each of the five areas described (air pollution, water pollution, superfund 
sites, animal waste, and industrial/manufacturing pollution). For example, the air 
pollution ranking was itself a cumulative measure of several types of air pollution 
rankings in 1999 (carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, PM-2.5, PM-10 emissions, sulfur 
dioxide, and volatile organic compounds emissions). The water pollution item was a 
ranking of the number of impaired water bodies according to the standards of the Clean 
Water Act in 1998. The superfund item was the state's ranking for the number of 
superfund sites located in the state. The animal waste item was the state's ranking for 
total animal waste in 1997. The toxic release from industry consisted of the state's 
ranking on total toxic releases from industrial activity. 
 
The rankings were standardized and then summed to create the pollution severity index 
ranging from −5.95 to 5.77 with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 3.02. Higher 
cumulative scores indicate a more polluted environment. This method weighs each of 
the five types of pollution equally, the appropriateness of which is debatable. 
Determining which type of pollution is actually more damaging or serious and expensive 
to remedy is well beyond the scope of this project. However, it seems clear that an 
analysis of aggregate environmental spending should consider more than just the 
amount of toxic releases from industry. Empirically, all five of these pollution rankings 
are relatively highly correlated, with the exception of water pollution, which was not as 
highly correlated with either animal pollution or toxic release from industry. Nonetheless, 
confirmatory factor analysis revealed the presence of one significant factor (eigenvalue 
= 2.11), and all variables loaded on the single factor at above 0.41. The scale reliability 
coefficient for the index was well within the acceptable range (α = 0.73). 
 
We used the disaggregated measures of pollution severity for the analysis of specific 
spending categories where there was a clear problem–spending link. Specifically in the 
analysis of air quality we use the air pollution component, and for water quality and 
pesticides, we use the water pollution component. As forests and wildlife can be 
affected by many different types of pollution, we use the aggregate pollution severity 
measure for the analysis of this spending area. 
 
The political factors that may influence spending are environmental and business 
organized interests and public opinion liberalism, although we expect limited, if any, 
influence from business. Many studies use Hall and Kerr's (1991) measure of the 
numbers of Greenpeace, National Wildlife Federation, and the Sierra Club per 1,000 
residents to estimate the strength of the environmental movement. This figure is 
outdated, however, so we use the number of Sierra Club members in 2000 per 1,000 
population in each state, obtained from the Sierra Club. Although less inclusive than 
Hall and Kerr's measure, we believe that this measure is a sound indicator of the 
strength of the environmental movement in a given state and should increase spending. 
Alternative measures such as the number of registered environmental organizations 
were tested in models not shown; this variable was highly correlated with both 
population and business registrants, so it was not included in the final models. 
Obviously, other environmental groups influence policy, but membership in these 
groups is correlated with Sierra membership.9 The measure ranged from 0 to 6.22 (per 
1,000) with a mean of 2.22 (SD = 1.4). 
 
Unlike environmental groups, business is not generally well organized at the grassroots 
level. As a result, it makes sense to measure business' political activities at the elite, 
institutional level. Therefore, we use the number of registered business organizations 
per 1,000 population in 1997. Previous studies have used membership in industrial and 
manufacturing groups (Bacot & Dawes, 1997) or measures of the economic importance 
of a particular sector (like mining or manufacturing) to a state's economy (Hedge & 
Scicchitano, 1994). Given the broad categories of spending examined here, we think it 
makes sense to include a broader measure of business mobilization. For example, in 
largely rural states, the primary polluters should be agricultural interests, which are not 
reflected in industry and manufacturing trade groups. Furthermore, the importance of 
economic interests to a state's economy may actually assess constituency influence, or 
the importance of the economy in pollution control decisions, rather than interest group 
influence. Therefore, we use total registered business organizations for our examination 
of aggregate environmental spending. The variable ranged from 0.03 to 0.38 (per 1,000) 
with a mean of 0.12 and a standard deviation of 0.08. In the disaggregated spending 
models, we use more precise sector-specific measures of registered organizations. 
Specifically, in the analysis of air quality, we use registered manufacturing 
organizations; for water quality and pesticide spending, we use registered agricultural 
interests. In spending categories where sectoral interests are not as specific (i.e. 
forestry and fish and wildlife), we use total business registrants.10 
 
Environmental studies have been inconsistent in their inclusion of citizen and elite 
ideology measures. Bacot and Dawes (1997) include Erikson, Wright, and McIver's 
(1993) measure of state ideology but do not include elite ideology or legislative 
liberalism. Hedge and Scicchitano (1994) discuss the importance of public opinion but 
do not include it in their final model. Potoski and Woods (2002) do not include either a 
mass public or elite ideology measure. Hays, Esler, and Hays (1996) include both in 
their model of state environmental policy, but neither measure is statistically significant 
when both are included. For the reasons outlined earlier, we believe that opinion 
liberalism may influence environmental spending, and we have included Erikson, 
Wright, and McIver's 1999 update of their 1993 measure of public opinion liberalism.11 
The opinion liberalism measure ranges from −0.43 to 0.17 with a mean of −0.12 (SD = 
0.11). Higher values indicate greater liberalism. 
 
Pollution severity and the environmental context may act independently to lead to more 
environmental spending, but they might also act in concert. To test whether the 
influence of pollution severity and the political environment conditionally influence state 
environmental spending, we use interaction terms between the relevant political 
variables and pollution severity. For the theoretical reasons stated above, we think that 
the strength of environmental interests is the most important political factor influencing 
state environmental spending. Moreover, the environmental movement likely has 
greater success when they can identify a severe pollution problem to the public. 
Therefore, we use an interaction of Sierra Club membership and pollution severity to 
test whether high levels of pollution and high levels of environmental activism lead to 
greater environmental spending. It is also possible that business mobilization and 
pollution severity interact to shape spending. For example, whereas business is 
generally less concerned with collective goods like spending, with severe pollution, 
business may become more active in fighting aggressive abatement measures. On the 
other hand, a severe problem may mitigate their ability to limit environmental spending. 
We test these possibilities using an interaction term of business registrants and pollution 
severity. 
 
Other variables are hypothesized to influence state spending in addition to problem 
severity and politics. As indicated, we expect larger and more populous states to spend 
more on the environment. The land and water area variable was collected from 
http://www.netstate.com and includes the square mileage of both land and water area in 
a state as both are under a state's jurisdiction. The land and water variable ranged from 
1,545 to 656,424 square miles with a mean of 75,747 and a standard deviation of 
96,226. The population data were collected from the 2000 census, available from the 
U.S. Census Bureau Web site (http://www.census.gov). In thousands, population 
ranged from 494 to 33,872 with a mean of 5,617 and a standard deviation of 6,186. 
Examining aggregate spending, Bacot and Dawes (1997) found that state fiscal health 
was not a significant determinant of environmental spending. Similarly, Hays, Esler, and 
Hays (1996) failed to observe a relationship between debt burden and policy 
commitment. Nonetheless, we include a measure of state fiscal health because it 
seems plausible that at least for some programs, a less fiscally stressed state may 
make the decision to allocate greater resources. We updated the measure used by 
Bacot and Dawes (1997) for 1999, which is a ratio of total state spending subtracted 
from total state revenue to total state spending. These data were obtained from the U.S. 
Census Bureau at http://www.census.gov and ranged from −0.10 to 1.85 (M = 0.26, SD 
= 0.29). We also categorized states into one of the four major Census regions 
(Northeast, South, West, Midwest) and created three dummy variables to assess any 
regional patterns. The Northeast dummy variable is not included in the model and is 
used as the baseline category.12 
 
   
Findings 
We begin our analysis by regressing total state environmental and natural resource 
spending on the political and nonpolitical variables discussed above (See Table 2). The 
first model accounts for 75% of the variance in total spending. The primary political 
variable, Sierra Club membership, is significant and is in the expected, positive direction 
using a one-tailed test. We can therefore expect an increase in environmental and 
natural resource spending as Sierra Club membership in a state increases. In dollar 
terms, for each unit increase in Sierra Club membership (per 1,000 population), we 
expect a $69.7-million increase in spending. 
  
 Table 2. Influences on State Environmental Spending by Program Area  
 
Variable 
Total 
spending Air quality 
Water 
quality Pesticide Forestry 
Fish and 
wildlife 
 
Opinion liberalism −335.394 
 
(369.646) 
−20.461 
 
(24.068) 
−250.008∧ 
 
(133.194) 
−46.838 
 
(28.401) 
−106.510∧ 
 
(62.722) 
−56.078 
 
(42.045) 
Sierra Club membership 69.678* 
 
(33.627) 
2.444∧ 
 
(1.568) 
26.529** 
 
(9.757) 
2.578* 
 
(1.488) 
23.873*** 
 
(5.495) 
17.816*** 
 
(2.991) 
Business registrants 1,213.89 
 
(1,297.027)  
— — — −59.852 
 
(148.721) 
−128.220 
 
(135.464) 
Manufacturing registrants  −125.700 
 
(393.412) 
— — — — 
Agriculture registrants  — 1,824.042 
 
(1,964.735) 
247.615 
 
(232.861) 
— — 
Sierra Club × problem 4.070 
 
(8.876) 
−1.455 
 
(2.759) 
3.197 
 
(4.579) 
1.201 
 
(1.669) 
3.468* 
 
(1.433) 
2.893*** 
 
(0.863) 
Business × problem 142.330 
 
(190.154) 
−145.364 
 
(330.774) 
1,750.599 
 
(1,608.770) 
333.150 
 
(306.109) 
−19.233 
 
(29.069) 
−32.496 
 
(28.790) 
Fiscal health 122.135 
 
(134.906) 
0.850 
 
(4.836) 
77.929∧ 
 
(51.093) 
1.605 
 
(1.843) 
−0.800 
 
(13.876) 
3.123 
 
(10.005) 
Land and water area −0.0004 
 
(0.0004) 
0.00003∧ 
 
(0.00002) 
−0.001** 
 
(0.0002) 
−0.0001∧ 
 
(0.0001) 
−0.0001 
 
(0.000) 
0.0001* 
 
(0.000) 
Problem severity −25.467 
 
(21.115) 
3.034 
 
(6.402) 
−18.688 
 
(19.506) 
−7.853 
 
(7.023) 
−8.996* 
 
(4.348) 
0.963 
 
(3.232) 
Population 50.613*** 
 
(14.274) 
36.468*** 
 
(10.101) 
107.897*** 
 
(24.559) 
14.5658*** 
 
(4.556) 
65.493*** 
 
(22.331) 
9.817 
 
(12.207) 
South 230.809∧ 
 
(134.216) 
10.322 
 
(6.591) 
32.048 
 
(39.467) 
3.717 
 
(4.065) 
41.766** 
 
(14.413) 
15.000 
 
(12.762) 
West −102.392 
 
(72.900) 
10.680* 
 
(4.311) 
21.363 
 
(29.364) 
1.790 
 
(4.307) 
29.802* 
 
(12.513) 
16.739 
 
(10.220) 
Midwest 120.477 
 
(110.861) 
12.954∧ 
 
(6.992) 
42.527 
 
(38.435) 
−0.836 
 
(5.045) 
26.787∧ 
 
(14.635) 
10.360 
 
(14.943) 
Constant −461.093 
 
(261.057) 
−20.944 
 
(17.221) 
−107.249* 
 
(43.285) 
−11.609 
 
(7.614) 
−94.077* 
 
(s34.867) 
−11.167 
 
(25.524) 
R-square Root Mean 
Standard Error 
0.747 193.8 0.831 11.256 0.605 56.743 0.392 10.774 0.854 24.365 0.754 22.983 
N 50 50 46 44 47 49 
 
OLS estimates, with robust standard errors. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. We use one-tailed tests where they are 
appropriate theoretical expectations. The problem severity variable is disaggregated for program areas that are clearly related 
to one type of policy. The air quality equation uses the air pollution indicator, and the water quality and pesticide equations 
use the water pollution indicator. The business × problem variable uses the appropriate pollution indicator with the appropriate 
business group. For example, the air quality equation uses the number of manufacturing registrants per capita multiplied by the 
air pollution severity indicator. 
 
 
As expected, states with larger populations spend more on the environment than those 
states with smaller populations. Indeed, more populated states have greater 
environmental expenditures even controlling for the state's land and water area. This is 
not surprising because both pollution levels and resources to fight pollution are linked to 
population. 
 
The coefficient for the Southern region is negative and marginally significant at the 0.10 
level using a two-tailed test, indicating that the region may spend more on the 
environment than the Northeast, the baseline category. This is somewhat surprising 
given the expectation that the Northeast would favor greater environmental 
expenditures. It is possible, however, that some states in this region such as Maine and 
Vermont may have lesser need to spend money on the environment because they have 
lower levels of pollution. Larger or more urban states in the Northeast like New York or 
Massachusetts may be sympathetic to environmental concerns, but environmental 
programs may face a tougher competition from other programs. Southern states also 
typically have significant rural areas that may require greater spending. 
 
Pollution severity was not a significant determinant of aggregate spending, contrasting 
with the findings of Bacot and Dawes (1996, 1997). This may stem from the different 
measure of pollution severity, but even using a measure of severity based on pollution 
from the manufacturing and industrial sector (i.e. Toxics Release Inventory), we did not 
find a significant relationship between severity and spending. We further speculate on 
this nonrelationship below. 
 
The variable for land and water area has no apparent influence on total environmental 
spending, although the results may be attributed to several outliers. States with large 
land areas like Alaska and Montana have relatively moderate environmental 
expenditures given their sizes, but they also have lower population. Despite the null 
findings, problem severity and land area serve as necessary controls in the spending 
model. Fiscal health is not significant in this model, confirming the findings of Bacot and 
Dawes (1996, 1997) that states with greater fiscal health do not appear to spend more 
money on environmental protection. 
 
Business interests did not have a significant influence on total spending. For the 
reasons explained above, we do not find this surprising. Businesses will not invest 
substantial effort in fighting for reduced expenditures for regulation and pollution control 
programs that might benefit the entire business community (or not affect the firm). 
Instead, they will focus on obtaining a preferential policy that resembles a purer private 
good. Further, business interests probably do not view these expenditures as a zero-
sum exchange where spending money on the environment necessarily detracts from 
the benefits that they seek. The coefficient for public opinion liberalism was not 
significant either. This is not surprising given the imperfect translation of environmental 
issues to the left–right spectrum (Ringquist, 1993); in an analysis not shown, 
Norrander's (2001) measure of state environmental opinion yielded similar results. 
Finally, neither interaction term is significant, suggesting that organized interests, 
whether representing business or the environment, do not gain or lose leverage when 
there are significant environmental problems, at least in the aggregate. 
 
Table 2 also presents the analysis of expenditures disaggregated by program area. It is 
likely that spending in each category is at least partly dependent on spending decision 
made in other program areas. This suggests using a seemingly unrelated estimation 
procedure, which would model this interdependence. Unfortunately, because various 
states are missing spending data in different categories, it would eliminate several 
states from the analysis. Thus, we estimate a separate model for each spending 
category. (As a diagnostic we did analyze these spending categories using a seemingly 
unrelated regression approach and found similar results.) 
 
Each of these program areas affects the environment and industries in different ways, 
and we therefore include a more specific measure of pollution severity and business 
mobilization in each of the several different program areas where a specific economic 
interest was apparent, as discussed above.13 We can see in Table 2 that some political 
factors did influence spending decisions, with the major exception of air quality. The 
model for air quality spending accounts for 83% of the variance in the dependent 
variable, but only the population and the West dummy variables are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level or better. Thus, more populated states are estimated to 
spend more on air quality, while the Western states spend more than the Northeast. 
The coefficient for the environmental mobilization measure was only significant at the 
0.10 level, and these marginal findings suggest some possible influence where others 
have found limited influences on air quality spending (Ringquist, 1993). The land and 
water area and Midwest variables were also positive and marginally significant at the 
0.10 level. Like the aggregate analysis, the relationship between pollution severity and 
spending was not significant (nor was the interaction of Sierra Club membership and 
pollution severity significant). 
 
For water quality spending, the model accounts for 61% of variance in this category, but 
both political and nonpolitical factors matter. Sierra Club membership is significant in the 
expected, positive direction, indicating that greater mobilization of environmental 
organizations increases spending. This amounts to an estimated $27 million increase in 
environmental expenditures for each unit increase in Sierra Club membership per 1,000 
population. Public opinion liberalism has a marginal and negative influence on water 
quality spending (although only at the 0.10 level). Turning to the nonpolitical variables, 
population is also significant in the expected, positive direction. Yet as land and water 
area increases, there is a significant decrease in spending on water quality, controlling 
for other factors. This may be because of the initial costs for environmental 
management, regulation, and protection, and the cost decreases per square mile as the 
state's area increases. The fiscal health coefficient is in the expected, positive direction, 
although significance is only at the 0.10 level. 
 
The pesticide model accounts for 39% of the variance in spending on that area. The 
Sierra Club membership coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that the 
organization is expected to increase pesticide spending. For each unit increase in Sierra 
Club membership per 1,000 people, we expect a near $2.6 million increase in 
environmental spending, which is a smaller effect than that in the water-spending 
model, but it is still notable because pesticide expenditures are on average 
approximately one-tenth of water spending. Thus, environmental interests play an active 
role in pesticide spending and in trying to influence policy in this area (cf. Bosso, 1987). 
Population also has an expected, positive influence on pesticide spending. A state's 
land and water area has a marginally significant and negative coefficient (p = <0.10). 
 
The forestry model explains 85% of the variance in spending. As expected, Sierra Club 
membership has a positive and significant influence on forestry spending. We can 
expect a $23.9 million increase in spending for each unit increase in Sierra Club 
membership per 1,000 people. Turning to the nonpolitical variables, problem severity 
has a negative coefficient, indicating that spending decreases as forestry problems 
become more severe. However, when we interacted problem severity with Sierra Club 
membership we observed a positive and significant coefficient. Thus, states with severe 
pollution and a strong environmental movement do demonstrate higher spending on 
forestry. This is an indication of how problem salience can condition interest 
organization influence, at least in some cases. The South and West regional dummies 
have positive and significant coefficients (the Midwest approaches significance), and the 
population coefficient is positive and significant. 
 
Turning to fish and wildlife spending, the model explains 75% of the variance, and the 
results are similar to those of other models. Sierra Club membership is an expected 
positive and significant political determinant of fish and wildlife spending, resulting in an 
expected $17.8 million increase in spending for each unit increase in membership per 
1,000 people. When we interact Sierra Club membership with problem severity, we 
observe a positive and significant effect. Thus, the organization's members can 
influence spending when problems are severe. Population is estimated as the only 
nonpolitical determinant of fish and wildlife spending. 
 
Taken together, the models presented in Table 2 show that political factors, specifically 
the strength of the state's environmental movement, are important determinants of state 
spending on the environment. This was true for aggregate spending and across all 
spending areas with the exception of air quality spending, in which it was only 
marginally significant. Public opinion liberalism is generally not significantly related to 
state spending, although we did note a marginally significant and negative coefficient in 
water quality spending. Even using Norrander's (2001) data on public opinion instead of 
opinion liberalism did not alter the results substantively. There are several possible 
reasons for this lack of influence, but the relationship between state liberalism and 
environmental policy is in need of greater study.14 For the reasons above, we are not 
surprised that business interests did not influence environmental spending. Businesses 
likely prefer to lobby for more particularized benefits, and they are less concerned with 
general environmental expenditures even in specific areas like air or water quality. 
 
The actual severity of pollution was not generally a significant determinant of spending 
on the environment. Even using more refined pollution measures in specific programs, 
this was the case. We did observe, however, that for two spending categories (forestry 
and fish and wildlife) the strength of the environmental interests and pollution severity 
interact to affect state spending. Thus, in states with well-organized environmental 
groups and severe pollution, spending is higher on these programs. While we did not 
anticipate this relationship on only these two spending categories (forestry and fish and 
wildlife), a reasonable explanation seems to involve the motivations for becoming 
involved in environmental groups. In many states, the environmental movement is 
motivated as much around conservation and outdoor recreation as it is around attempts 
to limit more urban pollution problems (e.g. air pollution). This likely explains why the 
West spends significantly more than the Northeast in two of our models. Thus, 
environmental interests probably have a greater ability to mobilize grassroots support 
on these forestry and fish and wildlife programs across all states than on other types of 
environmental programs, heightening the responsiveness of the state budget to actual 
environmental problems. 
 
The general lack of a relationship between pollution severity and spending deserves 
further comment, especially in light of prior research (Bacot & Dawes, 1996, 1997). 
Problem severity does not directly influence spending, but instead, the severity of 
environmental problems is filtered through the political process. Further, the salience of 
pollution is probably dependent to a large extent on the media. An analysis of state 
newspaper coverage during 1999 and 2000 indicated that there is actually a negative 
correlation between the number of environment- and pollution-related news stories and 
state pollution severity.15 Paradoxically, this may reflect that in the most polluted states, 
environmental issues receive less attention from the media (and thus the public) 
because pollution is simply seen as part of the status quo. In these cases, even groups 
like the Sierra Club may have a harder time raising the salience of pollution issues. 
 
It is also necessary to consider the fiscal context of the states when considering the 
relationship between pollution severity and environmental spending. The period of time 
that Bacot and Dawes (1996, 1997) examine is the late 1980s, a time of relative fiscal 
distress in the states. In that fiscal context, one would expect a closer relationship 
between objective environmental needs and state spending. Simply put, with scarce 
resources, states will try to spend enough, but little more on environmental protection.16 
The year we consider in this study (2000) represented very flush times for state 
budgets. In this fiscal context, states clearly had more flexibility, and thus those states 
with the loudest demand for more spending from environmental groups could afford to 
spend more whether it was strictly "needed" or not. 
 
Finally, although we focus on total spending because we believe it is appropriate for a 
policy area that it targeted as a public good, we also estimated all of our models using 
per capita spending and per capita spending in each program area (See Appendix).17 
Sierra Club membership is only estimated to increase per capita spending in the water 
quality and forestry model ($2.40 and $1.90 for every 1,000 members of the 
organization, respectively). The interaction between Sierra Club and problem severity is 
estimated to increase per capita fish and wildlife spending, and the variable approaches 
significance in the overall per capita and air quality models. There is a marginally 
significant and positive influence of agricultural interests on per capita pesticide 
spending and on the business interaction term with problem severity for the water 
quality model. The negative coefficients on this interaction term for the air quality and 
fish and wildlife models may indicate that business is able to influence per capita 
spending reductions when environmental problems are severe (p < 0.10). Fiscal health 
has a positive and significant expected impact on fish and wildlife spending. 
Interestingly, there are mixed results for land and water area, as the variable is 
estimated to increase per capita overall, air quality, and fish and wildlife spending, but it 
is expected to decrease water quality, pesticide, and forestry spending. In sum, 
organized interests have little, if any, impact on per capita spending, even in states that 
have more severe environmental problems. 
 
   
Conclusion      
This research adds to our understanding of how environmental problems and politics 
shape state environmental policies. Unlike prior research, we examined the effects of 
different types of pollution across different policy areas.18 We found that in the period of 
time under review here, the strength of environmental interests was a more consistent 
influence on policy than the actual severity of environmental problems. In two spending 
areas, these factors interact to shape state spending on the environment. For those 
concerned with how political interests affect public policy, we believe that influence is 
contingent on context, which is consistent with recent work by a number of neopluralist 
scholars (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Kamieniecki, 2006; Smith, 2000). 
 
The nonrelationship between problem severity and environmental spending may be 
counterintuitive, but it is routinely observed in other policy contexts, and therefore, it 
should not be very surprising. For example, in the United States, it is generally the 
poorest states that have traditionally focused fewer resources on antipoverty programs. 
While some of this can be explained by a simple lack of state resources, clearly it is also 
determined by the conservative ideology and weak labor unions that prevail in many of 
these states. Similarly, in the environmental policy realm, some state decision makers 
will be less sensitive to pollution and less willing to enact policies that are perceived as 
damaging to business and industry. Well-organized environmental interests can, with 
their mass base and potential electoral support or with the effective marshaling of 
information, convince state decision makers to spend more on the environment. From 
an environmental protection standpoint, the fact that state budgets do not appear 
proportionate to the scope of environmental problems is perhaps somewhat troubling, 
but given the political nature of the budget process it could scarcely be different. 
 
Many studies have noted the differences in environmental policy areas ranging from 
pesticides (Bosso, 1987) to water quality (Ringquist, 1993). Spending in these diverse 
areas are no different. While we find a consistent influence of the environmental 
movement across spending areas in aggregate terms, these interests are only 
influential determinants of per capita spending for water quality and forestry. At least in 
the water quality case, both per capita and overall water spending may be influenced by 
these interests because this area is to some extent targeted as both a collective good 
and at the individual level. Ultimately, it may be the case that different spending areas 
are influenced by a different set of factors, a further indication of the multidimensionality 
of the environmental issue area (Potoski & Woods, 2002). This is probably comforting to 
those worried about the dominance of one or two interests in the pressure system. 
 
     
Notes        
 
  1 The authors would like to thank Jerry Emison, Anthony Dodson, Dennis O. Grady, 
and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on this manuscript.  
 
  2 For the New York press release see 
http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/environmentdec/2005a/budgetincrease011805.html, 
and for the American Rivers report see http://www.americanrivers.org.  
 
  3 For example, consumption of and pollution by fossil fuels is far greater in states with 
larger states than smaller states according to the Energy Information Administration 
(see http://eia.doe.gov).  
 
  4  Berry and Berry (1990) discuss the likelihood of states emulating states in similar 
geographic areas and it is plausible that neighboring states may have similar spending 
patterns.  
 
  5 As a diagnostic, we also considered spending as a proportion of the total budget and 
per capita expenditures. The per capita spending models are found in the Appendix 
(and summary statistics) and are discussed later. As a percentage of the total budget, 
fiscal health is the key significant independent variable. Thus, fiscally healthy states 
invest a greater portion of funds, but not a greater amount, in environmental areas.  
 
  6 Comparable problem severity measures are difficult to construct for past-time points. 
Data on the number of registered businesses and the number of agricultural, 
manufacturing, and environmental registrants (in alternate specifications) simply do not 
exist at numerous time points for 50 states.  
 
  7 As federal program grants are partly determined by both the severity of state 
environmental problems and the preferences of state political actors (see Volden, 
2005), this is not problematic for testing the hypotheses of concern. Additionally, the 
proportion of state environmental spending comprised of federal grants has decreased 
dramatically since the 1980s (Bacot & Dawes, 1996).  
 
  8 In an earlier version of this manuscript we considered nonsalient spending 
categories like geologic survey, land management, and solid waste. Neither political nor 
contextual factors explained spending in these areas.  
 
  9 In earlier specification, the number of environmental registrants (provided by David 
Lowery and Virginia Gray) had a similar impact on environmental spending as Sierra 
Club membership. Additionally, Witko and Newmark's (2005) examination of interest's 
influence on policy suggests that mass-based interests like unions appear to influence 
policy with their membership base as opposed to the use of tactics like campaign 
contributions. We believe that a similar pattern will emerge in the environmental realm 
and we therefore include Sierra Club membership.  
 
  10 The data were provided by David Lowery and Virginia Gray. In an analysis not 
reported here, we also used business campaign contribution data collected from the 
National Institute on Money in State Politics as an indicator of business group strength. 
We also examined the total number of business organizations registered in each state, 
which is an absolute measure of business strength; given the high levels of collinearity 
with population, we use the measure discussed above. The results of these 
specifications were similar to the models included in this manuscript.  
 
  11 Data are available from Gerald C. Wright, Indiana University 
(http://php.indiana.edu/~wright1/).  
 
  12 We omit several variables from the final analysis that may be expected to influence 
spending. First, it has been argued that a mini-EPA structure is the most efficient for 
regulatory purposes, although how this would influence spending is not clear. Bacot and 
Dawes (1997) examined this variable and found that environmental agency structure did 
not influence state expenditures and additional unreported analysis confirmed this 
finding, and therefore the agency structure variable is omitted from the final models. We 
also considered that in many states, a substantial portion of the land is owned by the 
federal government (e.g. 83% in Nebraska, 64.5% in Utah; Rosenbaum, 2004). 
Estimating all models including the percentage of federally owned lands did not change 
results in any substantive way.  
 
  13 Each of these models was also examined using the total business registration 
values in 1997, the number of environmental registrants, and aggregate pollution 
severity. The results did not change substantively.  
 
  14 For example, Ringquist (1993) asserted that environmental policies do not fit neatly 
into the liberal–conservative continuum. Scholars have also speculated that 
conservative states may act more aggressively on the environment in an effort to fend 
off federal intervention in environmental affairs (Hays, Esler, & Hays, 1996). That is, 
rather than have the federal government issue sanctions for noncompliance with 
environmental regulations, conservative states would rather spend money to protect the 
environment themselves while maintaining maximum control over environmental 
policies.  
 
  15 We searched each state's newspapers using the key words "pollution" and 
"environment," omitting clearly unrelated references such as "noise pollution." We use 
per capita news stories to control for the fact that more populous states will naturally 
have more newspapers and hence more total news stories. Pollution severity and per 
capita news stories were correlated at −0.27. Further analysis is necessary, but it 
seems that media coverage does not adequately reflect state environmental problems, 
and therefore much of the public may actually be quite unaware of the true scope of 
environmental problems in their state.  
 
  16 We also tested whether states engaged in a race to the bottom with environmental 
spending. We computed the average spending amounts (overall and per capita) for all 
spending categories for neighboring states to determine if increases/decreases among 
neighboring states influenced spending. There was no effect on spending or per capita 
spending in any of these models.  
 
  17 The models are identical to the earlier models for comparison purposes. Population 
is left in the models for this purpose and because of our earlier arguments that higher 
populations might result in greater expenditures (the evidence for this is mixed). We 
estimated the models without population, and the significance for the other variables did 
not change substantively.  
 
  18  Lowry (1992) does examine pollution controls in a number of program areas.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
  
 Table A-1. Influences on Per Capita State Environmental Spending by Program Area  
 
Variable 
Overall 
Spending Air Quality 
Water 
Quality Pesticide Forestry 
Fish & 
Wildlife 
 
Opinion Liberalism 106.154 
 
(92.068) 
8.0503∧ 
 
(5.308) 
−5.680 
 
(27.386) 
−9.431 
 
(5.808) 
−0.065 
 
(9.958) 
1.249 
 
(22.955) 
Sierra Club membership −3.661 
 
(6.314) 
0.133 
 
(0.247) 
2.388* 
 
(1.404) 
0.201 
 
(0.201) 
1.885* 
 
(0.924) 
0.706 
 
(1.603) 
Business registrants 324.590 
 
(225.086) 
— — — 4.944 
 
(32.389) 
−7.222 
 
(40.769) 
Manufacturing registrants — −56.665 
 
(49.814) 
— — — — 
Agriculture registrants — — 232.441 
 
(303.798) 
75.253∧ 
 
(38.810) 
— — 
Sierra Club × Problem 2.878∧ 
 
(1.754) 
0.608∧ 
 
(0.376) 
0.929 
 
(0.980) 
0.276 
 
(0.3656) 
0.152 
 
(0.171) 
0.850* 
 
(0.430) 
Business × Problem 5.706 
 
(37.190) 
−100.328∧ 
 
(52.525) 
417.085∧ 
 
(304.422) 
92.208 
 
(66.614) 
−2.073 
 
(5.611) 
−15.423∧ 
 
(8.294) 
Fiscal Health 29.140 
 
(28.447) 
−0.650 
 
(0.698) 
9.982 
 
(10.322) 
0.013 
 
(0.366) 
0.633 
 
(2.148) 
17.974* 
 
(7.987) 
Land and water area 0.0002** 
 
(0.0001) 
0.00003*** 
 
(0.000004) 
−0.00008∧ 
 
(0.00005) 
−0.0000178∧ 
 
(0.000010) 
−0.000009∧ 
 
(0.000007) 
0.00013*** 
 
(0.00002) 
Problem severity −4.945 
 
(4.701) 
0.884 
 
(1.060) 
−3.9135 
 
(3.687) 
−1.671 
 
(1.554) 
0.390 
 
(0.470) 
0.274 
 
(0.826) 
Population −0.003 
 
(0.002) 
−0.0003** 
 
(0.00009) 
0.00003 
 
(0.0002) 
0.0001* 
 
(0.000) 
−0.0004∧ 
 
(0.0003) 
−0.0018*** 
 
(0.0004) 
South 15.374 
 
(17.845) 
1.460 
 
(1.217) 
1.571 
 
(6.609) 
−0.224 
 
(0.667) 
3.941∧ 
 
(1.996) 
−4.167367 
 
(3.611) 
West 7.936 
 
(22.038) 
0.820 
 
(0.932) 
0.992 
 
(9.015) 
−0.897 
 
(0.942) 
5.719* 
 
(2.541) 
−1.719 
 
(5.080) 
Midwest −13.400 
 
(18.799) 
0.468 
 
(1.063) 
4.925 7.541 −0.925 
 
(1.060) 
0.163 
 
(1.944) 
−8.050* 
 
(3.909) 
Constant 44.602 
 
(36.093) 
3.975* 
 
(1.713) 
2.872 
 
(5.912) 
0.159 
 
(1.134) 
−1.188 
 
(3.789) 
12.268 
 
(8.959) 
R-square Root Mean 
Standard Error 
0.549 40.711 0.696 1.845 0.2627 
10.405 
0.206 2.248 0.568 4.028 0.846 8.981 
N 50 50 46 44 47 49 
 
OLS estimates, with robust standard errors. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Overall spending (M = 66.29, 
SD = 52.68); air (M = 3.61, SD = 2.91); water (M = 9.40, SD = 10.38); pesticide (M = 1.08, SD = 2.14); forest (M = 5.34, 
SD = 5.27); fish and wildlife (M = 15.22, SD = 19.84). We use one-tailed tests where they are appropriate due to theoretical 
expectations. The problem severity variable is disaggregated for program areas that are clearly related to one type of policy. 
The air quality equation uses the air pollution indicator, and the water quality and pesticide equations use the water 
pollution indicator. The Business × Problem variable uses the appropriate pollution indicator with the appropriate business 
group. For example, the air quality equation uses the number of manufacturing registrants per capita multiplied by the air 
pollution severity indicator. 
 
 
 
 
